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STATE ACTION-LANDLORD LIEN ENFORCEMENT DOES NOT CON-
STITUTE STATE ACTION VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS. Hitchcock v.
Allison, 572 P.2d 982 (Okla. 1977).
I. INTRODUCTION
The Oklahoma Supreme Court was recently required to determine
whether the acts of a private party, done pursuant to a state statute
authorizing the conduct, constituted state action subject to fourteenth
amendment due process requirements as applied through 42 U.S.C. §
1983.1 In the case of Hitchcock v. Allison,2 tenants brought a replevin
action against their landlord for household goods and other personal
property which he had seized and stored without notice or a prior hear-
ing. The landlord claimed a lien on the items pursuant to an
Oklahoma statute3 and to satisfy amounts claimed due as unpaid rental
and damages. His actions were not covered by any provision of the
oral rental agreement and were taken without any aid from state offi-
cials. The trial court denied the tenants' writ of replevin and rendered
a money judgment in favor of the landlord, establishing a lien on the
tenants' personal property then in the possession of the landlord. The
tenants brought an appeal challenging the constitutionality of the land-
lord lien statute,4 and the lower court's decision upholding the statute
was affirmed by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The statute, as ap-
proved by that court, allows a landlord to seize a tenant's personal pos-
sessions found in the rental unit upon the landlord's unilateral
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
. . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceedings for redress.
2. 572 P.2d 982 (Okla. 1977).
3. OKLA. STAT. tit. 41, § 42 (Supp. 1977) provides:
An operator shall have a lien upon that part of the property belonging to the tenant
which has a value not to exceed the amount of proper charges owed by the tenant, which
may be in a rental unit used by him at the time notice is given, for the proper charges
owed by the tenant, and for the cost of enforcing the lien, with the right to possession of
the property until the debt obligation is paid to the operator. Provided, however, that
such lien shall be secondary to the claim of any prior bona fide holder of a chattel mort-
gage or to the rights of a conditional seller of such property, other than the tenant.
4. Id
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determination of overdue rent. Because the statute does not provide
for regulation of this activity by state officials in any way,5 the potential
for abuse by the landlord and disproportionate hardship on the tenant
is apparent.
An investigation of the constitutionality of Oklahoma's landlord
lien law must necessarily begin with an initial decision as to whether a
private person acting under the authority of the statute does so under
color of state law.6 The criteria courts have applied to determine the
presence or absence of state action are elusive, ambiguous, and subject
to result-oriented interpretations which often produce conflicting deci-
sions in identical fact situations.7 The disorderly case-by-case analysis
of state action decisions concerning the constitutionality of landlord
lien statutes was noted by the Oklahoma court in its decision when it
was presented with conflicting decisions on the question from various
federal circuit courts. This note will analyze the evolution and modem
judicial treatment of landlord lien laws, and will evaluate their func-
tion, effectiveness and desirability vis-a-vis the state action-private ac-
tion dichotomy.
II. EVOLUTION AND CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
Landlord lien statutes originated as a result of the traveling condi-
tions in medieval England.8 Because road travel was dangerous, espe-
cially at night, the law imposed an absolute duty upon innkeepers to
receive any traveler and to keep his goods safe. To compensate the
innkeeper for the imposition of absolute duty and liability to all guests,
the law allowed him the extraordinary self-help measure of distraint of
the traveler's personal baggage until the cost of the lodging was paid.
5. There is no court determination in an adversary context that the rent is indeed overdue
and that the value of the property sought to be seized does not exceed the amount of rent claimed.
Id
6. Purely private action is not subject to the fourteenth amendment due process require-
ments of prior notice and hearing; action taken under color of state law must conform to these
requirements. See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1, 13 (1948), in which the Supreme Court stated:
Since the decision of this court in the CivilRights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), the principle
has become firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the action inhibited by the
first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be
that of the States. That Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct,
however discriminatory or wrongful.
7. See Black, The Supreme Court 1966 Term, Forward- "State Action," Equal Protection, and
California r Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. Rav. 69 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Black]; Glennon &
Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976
Sup. CT. REv. 221 [hereinafter cited as Glenon & Nowak].
8. Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970). See generally, Hogan, The Innkeeper's
Lien at Common Law, 8 HAsTINos L. J. 33 (1956).
1978]
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Such a remedy did not extend at common law to landlords or board-
inghouse keepers, however the concept evolved into a modern counter-
part, codified in many state laws, which provides innkeepers, as well as
boardinghouse keepers and landlords, a statutory lien on tenants' per-
sonal property to satisfy unpaid rent charges.9 These statutes typically
do not require the tenant to be given any notice or hearing prior to
seizure of his possessions by the landlord and do not involve any activ-
ity on the part of state officials.' 0 Tenants have challenged the constitu-
tionality of such statutes, alleging that the landlord's activity is a
violation of due process occurring under color of state law." The re-
sulting federal court decisions have produced two directly conflicting
lines of opinion.
The Ninth and Fifth Circuits have found the landlord's conduct
under such statutory authority to be under color of state law and there-
fore subject to the due process requirements of the fourteenth amend-
ment.12 In Hall v. Garson,'s the fifth circuit based its finding of state
action upon a "public function" theory.'4 The execution of a lien in
Texas is ordinarily performed by a sheriff or constable. Therefore, the
court reasoned, when a private party undertakes such an activity, he is
necessarily subject to the same constitutional standards that are im-
posed upon the conduct of state officials.' 5 The Ninth Circuit, in Cul-
bertson v. Leland,6 adopted and further refined the public function
theory set forth in Hall v. Garson. Pointing out that at common law
9. See, ag., Arizona Innkeeper's Lien Statute, Amiz. R~v. STAT. § 33-951 (1974); Massachu-
setts Boardinghouse Lien Statute, MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 255, § 23 (West 1959); TEX. Ru v.
Civ.-STAT. AN. art. 5236d (Vernon 1978).
10. See note 3 supra.
11. See notes 12-19 infra.
12. Culbertson v. Leland, 528 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1975); Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir.
1970).
13. 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970).
14. The "public function" rationale used to support a finding of state action is based in large
part on Justice Black's majority opinion in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946), in which
he stated, "the more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in
general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of
those who use it .... Since these facilities ar  built and operated primarily to benefit the public
and since their operation is essentially a public function, it is subject to state regulation." This
analysis was emphasized by Justice Douglas in writing the majority opinion in Evans v. Newton,
382 U.S. 296 (1966), where he pointed out that when state courts aid private parties to conduct an
activity ordinarily only performed by the state, such conduct is subject to the fourteenth amend-
ment.
The "public function" theory appears to have survived the Supreme Court's decision in Jack-
son v. Metropolitan Edison Co. 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974), as witnessed by the statement in the
opinion of the Court that "[w]e have, of course, found state action present in the exercise by a
private entity of powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State."
15. 430 F.2d at 439.
16. 528 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1975).
[Vol. 13:864
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extraordinary self-help was provided to innkeepers only, the court em-
phasized that the lien created in favor of landlords and boardinghouse
keepers by the Arizona statute in question had no common law basis,
but had its origin in the State legislature. The Arizona statute then
was not merely codifying a pre-existing common law right, but was
extending this right to parties to whom it had never been available at
common law. The court found the statutory creation of new rights
favoring landlords to be a significant indication of state action.17 Sev-
eral federal district courts have reached the same result18 and found
statutes which authorize summary landlord seizure of tenant property
without notice or hearing constitutionally impermissible violations of
the due process clause. 9
Taking the opposite position, the First Circuit has determined that
the seizure of a tenant's personal effects under statutory authority does
not constitute state action. In Davis v. Richmond,20 the court was
presented with a constitutional challenge to a Massachusetts landlord
lien law.21 In a fact situation virtually identical to those considered by
the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, the First Circuit found the actions of the
17. "In the present case, the statute was appellee Leland's sole authority for the seizure,
which would not otherwise have been even colorably legal. And since the statute was the sine qua
non for the activity in question, the state's involvement through the statute is not insignificant.'
Id at 432 (footnote omitted).
The court also distinguished the instant situation from the seizure by a conditional seller,
pursuant to a sales contract, of property serving as security for the loan of its purchase price.
"Special interests of the conditional seller attach to the specific goods which serve as his collateral,
interests which are not present in the case of a general debt and indiscriminate seizure of property
as collateral." Id at 431 (citations omitted). The court went on to emphasize the narrow limits
within which the conditional seller might act, and contrasted his activity with the broad and rela-
tively undefined activity of the landlord, observing that "[t]he latter, because its . . . impact is
potentially much more severe, is the type of activity which is a function of the state and over
which, ordinarily, the state has a monopoly." Id (citations omitted). The Fifth Circuit, in James
v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974), also distinguished repossession under Uniform Commer-
cial Code provisions from landlord seizures, emphasizing that the latter closely resemble seizure in
satisfaction of a judgment, a traditional state function.
The Ninth Circuit, in Culbertson, based its distinction between seizure by a conditional seller
and seizure by a landlord on the fact that the former remedy existed at common law and predated
any statutory codification. The court observed that the challenged Arizona statute created a right
in a private party to perform a function traditionally undertaken by the state, a right without a
background in common law and without contract authorization. The result was state action in
the opinion of the court and the court held the statute unconstitutionally deficient in due process.
18. See, e.g., Johnson v. Riverside Hotel, Inc. 399 F. Supp. 1138 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Gross v.
Fox, 349 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
19. Shaffer v. Holbrook, 346 F. Supp. 762 (S.D.W. Va. 1972), traces West Virginia's sum-
mary distress procedure back to the landlord's right to distraint at common law. In this case, the
court found state action resulting from the requirement of a warrant issued by a state official.
Following the rationale in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), the court held
that the state procedure denied due process.
20. 512 F.2d 201 (1st Cir. 1975).
21. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 255, § 23 (West 1959).
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landlord pursuant to the statute to be purely private conduct. The
court considered two of the factors which other federal courts had felt
to be indicative of state action,22 but found them unpersuasive. In re-
jecting the argument that statutory authorization of previously illegal
acts gives rise to conduct under color of state law, the court stated,
"Merely because a state "legalizes" something does not necessarily sig-
nal that the state itself has become a participant."23 Stressing instead
that the statute was performing the neutral function of clarifying com-
peting rights, the court refused to find state action in private conduct
pursuant to the statute.24 The court also rejected the public function
theory as a foundation for state action, because it could find no ex-
pressed state support, symbiotic relationship, joint activity, or delega-
tion of powers.25
III. THE OKLAHOMA DECISION
The rationales which support the conflicting results reached by the
various federal courts were analyzed by the Oklahoma Supreme Court
as a basis for its decision concerning the presence of state action. The
court, adopting the approach used by the First Circuit in Davis v.
Richmond,26 disregarded the significance of the statutory creation of
new rights and instead reiterated "that merely because a State legalizes,
certain action does not necessarily signal that the State itself has be-
come a participant."'27 The court held that the statutory enactment of a
right to act within narrowly defined limits did not result in state action,
and pointed out that this decision was in line with the its earlier hold-
ing in Hefinstine v. Martin.28 That case concerned repossession by a
creditor under a provision of the Oklahoma version of the Uniform
22. See notes 12 and 18 supra and accompanying text.
23. Davis v. Richmond, 512 F.2d 201, 204 (Ist Cir. 1975).
24. "Such self-help is inherently private, and we can find no significant state involvement in
the legislature's choice of a point at which to draw the line between permissible individual conduct
and the necessity for state intervention." Id at 205.
25. The Seventh Circuit adopted the reasoning of Davis v. Richmond, 512 F.2d 201 (1st Cir.
1975), in upholding an Illinois hotelkeeper's lien statute against a constitutional challenge. See
Anastasia v. Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank, 527 F.2d 150 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928
(1976). The court refused to find state and private conduct to be so entwined as to amount to state
action by the mere passage of legislation, and simply disagreed with the public function rationale
supporting the decision in Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970), without a real attempt to
distinguish the case.
26. 512 F.2d 201 (1st Cir. 1975).
27. Hitchcock v. Allison, 572 P.2d 982, 986 (Okla. 1977) (quoting Davis v. Richmond, 512
F.2d 201, 204 (1st Cir. 1975).
28. 561 P.2d 951 (Okla. 1977).
[Vol. 13:864
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Commercial Code. 9 While recognizing that the decision in Hefinstine
was based in part on the fact that the Oklahoma U.C.C. provision did
not create new rights, but only codified a pre-existing common law
remedy, the court felt the lack of involvement of any state official was
equally determinative of the result there and significant when applied
to the present situation.3"
An evaluation of the Oklahoma court's state action analysis must
begin with a recognition of the dual nature of the functions performed
by the fourteenth amendment.31 Purely individual activity is shielded
from what would otherwise be the intolerable interference of govern-
ment regulation, while the states are required to perform their activities
under constitutional restrictions which protect civil liberties.3 2 The im-
pact of the fourteenth amendment thus affects both public and private
action. However, conduct which is totally public or private is rarely
litigated in a context which requires application of the state action doc-
trine. Indeed, it has been suggested that as a result of the modern com-
plex interrelation of state regulation and private conduct, state action is
always present to some degree in any individual activity.33 It is in this
vast gray area, where state action is arguably present, that both parties
claim the protection of the fourteenth amendment; one party asserting
that his autonomous decision-making should be protected from gov-
ernmental interference, the other claiming that the state is involved to a
sufficient degree to require the conduct to be subject to constitutional
safeguards so as to protect civil liberties.34 The issue which the state
action doctrine is then called upon to resolve is where the challenged
activity falls on the continuum of state-private activity. Scrutiny of the
challenged activity under the Oklahoma statute therefore involves the
balancing of two factors: the nature and extent of the state involvement
is balanced against an examination of the allegedly private conduct
giving rise to the litigation.35
29. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 9-503 (1971).
30. "We think when these same criteria are applied to the case at bar, the same finding-no
State action-results." 572 P.2d at 986.
31. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1149-50 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
TRIBE]; Note, State Action and the Burger Court, 60 VA. L. REv. 840, 841 (1974).
32. See Black, supra note 7 at 100-01; Note, StateAction" Theories/or Applying Constitutional
Restrictions to Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 656, 665 (1974) [hereinafter cited as State
Action].
33. Black, supra note 7 at 70; Williams, The Twiight of State Action, 41 TEXAS L. REV. 347,
370 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Williams].
34. See TRIBE, supra note 31 at 1184; Glennon & Nowak, supra note 7 at 226-27; Williams,
supra note 33, at 370.
35. See Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 593, 597 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) where the court concluded-
19781
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The Oklahoma court characterized the effect of the statute in ques-
tion as "merely providing rules by which the parties can peacefully set-
tle their dispute rather than acting as a moving party."36 However, it is
difficult to accept the court's characterization of the statute as neutral
rule-making when it provides one party with legal authority for previ-
ously illegal conduct without affording the other party any means of
protection against the arbitrary and abusive use of such power.37 Such
statutory promotion of the interests of one party at the expense of an-
other goes beyond disinterested regulation and indicates a legislative
preference for a particular course of action, a course of action which is
only legally permissible as a result of statutory enactment.3 8 These con-
siderations argue persuasively that such conduct is pursued under color
of state law and should be subject to due process limitations.39
The second part of the state action inquiry requires an examina-
tion of the allegedly private conduct giving rise to the litigation. Such
examination allows a determination of the extent to which these actions
should be considered purely private so as to be free from constitutional
restrictions. In part this requires ascertaining whether the landlord's
conduct is the type of activity which has traditionally been the result of
private decision-making and, thus, the type of individual autonomous
conduct which the fourteenth amendment is designed to protect from
governmental interference. The public function analysis used by sev-
eral federal courts' is relevant on this issue. These courts point out
In determining whether state involvement has risen to the level of "significance" for
state action purposes, therefore, inquiry should focus upon the alleged sphere of privacy
and autonomy in need of protection from federal intervention, as well as upon the cus-
tomary search for some causal relation, however tenuous, between state activity and the
discrimination alleged.
See also Comment, State Act'ornA Pathology and a Proposed Cure, 64 CAL L. Rev. 146 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as State Action].
36. 572 P.2d at 986.
37. See StateAction, supra note 32 at 665, in which the writer contends that when the govern-
ment increases power or status in an individual beyond that which existed at common law it has
granted power, the use of which is subject to fourteenth amendment restraints.
38. See Adickes v. Kress, 398 U.S. 144, 203, 212 (1969) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109, 114 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
39. One scholar, in discussing repossession under state-enacted U.C.C. provision 9-503 has
stated that:
IT]he question whether procedural due process is accorded by the system of rules
through which a state allocates powers and duties in disputes between creditors and
peaceful (if allegedly wrongful) possessors focuses attention at once on an aspect of state
law: that aspect either is or is not constitutional; that it is "state action" could hardly be
clearer.
Tribe, supra note 31 at 1171.
40. See James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Riverside Hotel, Inc., 399
F. Supp. 1138 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Gross v. Fox, 349 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
[Vol. 13:864
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that the landlord is performing a function ordinarily reserved to the
state. Therefore imposing constitutional due process duties does not in-
vade an area historically preserved to individual activity, because such
activity has not traditionally been undertaken privately.
Deprivation of property to satisfy a general debt has always been a
governmental function and subject to due process requirements of prior
notice and hearing except under extraordinary circumstances.4 1 The
Oklahoma court believed that the situations in which landlord lien
laws are invoked made it necessary to dispense with these require-
ments, and referred to the Davis case, which allowed the possessory
advantage to go to the landlord so as to prevent the tenant from ab-
sconding with his property and leaving the rent unpaid.42 The most
compelling practical argument in favor of the landlord is that giving
the tenant prior notice would allow him an opportunity to leave with
his possessions before the landlord could collect the rent.43 The private
interest which the landlord promotes by using the statute is to insure
that the rent allegedly owing is paid. However, the Forcible Entry and
Detainer (F.E.D.) statutes" already furnish a summary process to the
landlord which allows him to bring the tenant into court without delay
and obtain a writ of execution on the tenant's goods for rental owed.45
These statutes provide the immediate relief sought by the landlord and
at the same time offer the tenant judicial resolution of the rent dispute.
With this quick judicial determination available, the legislative de-
cision to provide the landlord with an additional self-help provision in
the form of a landlord lien statute may be explained by the amount of
rental often involved in the situations where landlord lien statutes are
invoked.46 Many times the charges sought are too small to make resort
41. See State Action, supra note 35, at 170-78.
42. But see Barber v. Rader, 350 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Fla. 1972), in which the court denied this
extraordinary self-help measure on constitutional grounds because the statute under attack did not
require a showing that summary seizure was needed under the facts in the case.
43. But see Blye v. Globe-Wernicke Realty Co., 33 N.Y.2d 15, 300 N.E.2d 710,347 N.Y.S.2d
170 (1973), which argues that landlord lien statutes are ineffective to prevent such conduct by a
determined tenant.
44. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1148.1-.16 (1971 and Supp. 1977).
45. See, eg., Oklahoma Forcible Entry and Detainer Statutes: OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1148.4
(1971) (requiring the tenant to appear in court 5 to 10 days after receiving summons); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 12, § 1185.10 (1971) (providing for levy of a writ of execution on the tenant's goods ifjudgment
is in favor of the landlord); and OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1148.14 (1971) (allowing actions for
amounts under $400 to be brought in small claims court).
46. While it is true that in Hitchcock the landlord was claiming an amount of $453.54, the
court referred to another case, Culbertson v. Leland, 528 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1975), which involved
$20. A survey of the facts in cases involving litigation of landlord lien statutes shows that the
amount in controversy is often less than $100. See Johnson v. Riverside Hotel, Inc., 399 F. Supp.
1138 (S. D. Fla. 1975) ($12.38); Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. 111. 1972)
1978]
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to judicial action under the F.E.D. statutes practical. Landlord lien
statutes provide the landlord with a convenient and cost-free means of
coercing payment of an amount allegedly due, allowing him to bypass
the safeguards built into the F.E.D. statutes and to invade the civil lib-
erties of the tenant. The landlord may use the statute without showing
such self-help is necessary for his protection under the circumstances of
the specific case, and without supervision to insure the value of prop-
erty seized does not exceed the debt claimed. The private interest
which the statute protects is not necessity, but convenience.
The Oklahoma legislature recently had the opportunity to recon-
sider the propriety of the landlord lien statute when it undertook an
extensive recodification of residential landlord-tenant law. The new
act 47 retains the wording of the law under which Hitchcock v. Allison
was decided,48 but in addition provides that the lien given to the land-
lord by the statute may be enforced in the same manner as any other
general lien in Oklahoma.49 The foreclosure procedure provides that
notice must be given to the tenant ten days before the sale of his prop-
erty by the landlord. The foreclosure sale cannot occur until thirty
days after the lien has accrued. These new notice requirements pro-
vide the tenant with more protection than was available under the old
statute. However, the actual benefit is minimal. The right to posses-
sion is still with the landlord, and no provision is made for a hearing on
the issue before an impartial tribunal.
Because the landlord lien statute goes beyond the neutral process
set out in the F.E.D. statutes and promotes the interest of the creditor
by permitting his encroachment upon the civil liberties of the debtor, a
significant degree of state involvement can be argued. Balanced
against this state involvement is the activity of the landlord, who claims
freedom from constitutional obligations for conduct which is not ordi-
narily found in the purely private sphere, and which is desirable not
because such activity is necessary but because it is convenient and inex-
pensive. It is difficult to support the Oklahoma Supreme Court's deci-
sion to uphold the constitutionality of the landlord lien law when it
($28.28); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970) ($5.00); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F.
Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970) ($60.00); Blye v. Globe-Wernicke Reality Co., 33 N.Y. 15, 300 N.E. 2d
710, 347 N.Y.S. 2d 170 (1973) ($60.60).
47. Residential Landlord And Tenant Act, ch. 257, §§ 1-40, 1978 Okla. Sess. Laws 675 (effec-
tive October 1, 1978) (repealing OKLA. STAT. tit. 41, §§ 31, 32, 34, 39 (1971) and OKLA. STAT. tit.
41, §§ 41, 42, 43 (Supp. 1971) (to be codified as OKLa. STAT. tit. 41, §§ 101-135)).
48. OKLA. STAT. tit. 41, § 42 (Supp. 1977).
49. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 42, § 91 (Supp. 1977) for the procedure to be followed when fore-
closing a general lien.
[Vol. 13:864
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empowers the private performance of a traditionally public function,
and dispenses with due process guarantees for the convenience of a
favored party.
The Oklahoma court has disregarded what other courts have
found to be a significant degree of state involvement, the statutory au-
thorization of a course of conduct. It has chosen instead to emphasize
the absence of activity by any state official and to weigh heavily the
private aspects of the activity challenged, despite the public nature of
the function performed and the lack of any compelling necessity for
such activity to occur without due process guarantees. The holding is
unfortunate because it disregards the fact that private interest lessens as
the private actor moves into a relationship with the public generally,50
and that "how private power is used in our society, insofar as it affects
the rights of citizens, [has] finally been recognized as amenable to con-
stitutional and judicial remedy."'" The state action concept is a tool for
separating out those non-governmental activities whose existence so
impairs certain fundamental values that they are proscribed by the
Constitution. 2 In a conflict between competing individual rights, the
courts must determine whether the fourteenth amendment dictates a
preference for one over the other. The Oklahoma court has chosen to
uphold a statute which legitimizes a practice repugnant to constitu-
tional guarantees and which operates to deprive a segment of the public
of its civil liberties. The fourteenth amendment and the Civil Rights
Act require that private power sanctioned by statute should operate
under constitutional limitations and it is the duty of the courts to en-
force these limitations.
IV. CONCLUSION
The landlord lien law does not directly authorize a state official to
seize property of a tenant to satisfy rent charges. Instead it permits the
landlord to do so when he decides charges are owing. The law pro-
vides no means by which the tenant can protect himself from a land-
lord who is mistaken as to the rental charges or who seizes property in
excess of the amount allegedly due. The potential for abuse in giving
50. Wiliams, supra note 33 at 370.
51. Nerkin, .4 New Dealfor the Protection ofFourteenth .4mendment Rights: Challenging the
Doctrinal Bases of the CivilRights Cases and State Action Theory, 12 HARv. C.L. L. Rav. 297, 362
(1977) (footnote omitted).
52. "The Amendment does not require the judiciary to determine whether a state has "ac-
ted," but whether a state has "deprived" someone of a guaranteed right." Glennon & Nowak,
supra note 7, at 229.
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such unsupervised authority to a party who is interested in the conflict
cannot be justified by the interest which the statute ostensibly pro-
motes. The landlord's right to receive rent due is adequately protected
by the F.E.D. statutes, which also afford the tenant due process. The
wisdom of the legislature in placing such discretionary power in the
hands of the landlord is questionable since the peaceful settlement of
disputes which it intends to promote occurs only with great hardship to
the tenant.
The holding of the Oklahoma Supreme Court that conduct pursu-
ant to such a statute is not under color of state law is equally difficult to
justify. The statute cannot be characterized as neutral when it plainly
and unnecessarily advances the interest of one party to the detriment of
the other. Such activity would undeniably be unconstitutional if un-
dertaken by a state official, and would undeniably be illegal unless au-
thorized by statute. The Civil Rights Act of 1871 was enacted to
prevent the states from by-passing constitutional guarantees by delegat-
ing their public functions to private individuals. This, however, is ex-
actly the result which the Oklahoma legislature has produced and
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